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Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexuals
Adequately Protected From
Discrimination In Housing And
Employment?
Injustice must be rooted out by strong, persistent and
determined action-Martin Luther King, Jr.1
Society's condemnation of homosexuality has taken many forms;
most notably, conspicuous discrimination based solely on one's
sexual orientation.2 Homosexuals3 have long suffered the indignity
of discrimination by both government and private society.4 Even
today, one suspected of being homosexual faces discrimination in
housing, employment, education, and social acceptance. 5
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WArT 89 (1964) (emphasis added).
2. See John Cary Sims, Moving Toward Equal Treatment ofHomosexuals, 23 PAC. L.J. 1543,
1543-44 (1992); see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 51.7(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining sexual orientation
as heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality). The particular emphasis of "sexual orientation"
within this Comment will be "homosexuality."
3. See WEBsTER's NINrH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 508 (1991) (noting that when used
as a noun, "gay" is an expression for homosexual). As used in this Comment, the term "gay" and
"homosexual" will refer to both male and female homosexuals.
4. See Sims, supra note 2, at 1543-44. Professor Sims' essay posits that homosexuals have
little to no recourse to the United States Constitution for protection under either the privacy doctrine
or the equal protection doctrine in light of the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Sims, supra note 2, at 1573. Professor Sims' ultimate conclusion is that homosexuals will not receive
heightened scrutiny review, and therefore any progress in the struggle for equal rights for
homosexuals will have to come at the hands of Congress, state legislatures, and state courts. Id.
5. Id. at 1544; see also id. at 1545 n.5 (describing the confusion surrounding the public's
attitude toward homosexuality). For sources discussing the discrimination faced by gays, see Terry
Friedman, AB 2601-Sexual Orientation Job Discrimination: Fact Sheet (Aug. 20, 1992) at 3
[hereinafterAB 2601 Fact Sheet]; James A. Douglas, I Sit and Look Out: Employment Discrimination
Against Homosexuals and the New Law of Unjust Dismissal, 33 WASH. U. J. URa. & CONTEMP. L
73 (1988); Joel W. Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in
Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L REv. 527 (1979); Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality andthe SocialMeaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. (1988); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HAST.
LJ. 799 (1979); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties Part I,
10 U. DAYTON L REV. 459 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference
Law, 30 DRAKE L REv. 311 (1980-81); Developments in the Law, Sexual Orientation and the Law:
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There is little comprehensive statistical data documenting sexual
orientation discrimination.' Assemblymember Terry Friedman, the
author of several gay civil rights bills in California, has attempted to
compile what information does exist in various memoranda prepared
by his office.7 According to Assemblymember Friedman, there is
enough empirical data to demonstrate that discrimination against
homosexuals in housing and employment is sufficient to warrant
legislation to protect homosexuals.8 For example, a national
Teichner poll conducted in 1989 discovered that 17% of the respon-
dents in the western United States had been subjected to sexual
orientation discrimination while on the job.9 A Wall Street Journal
poll in 1987 found that 66% of the respondent chief executive
officers of Fortune 500 companies would hesitate to promote a
homosexual employee to a management position. 10 A study by
Overlooked Opinions, a Chicago marketing research firm which
focuses on gay social and workplace issues, not mentioned by
Friedman, but found in the Los Angeles Times, indicated that of
6,500 gays and lesbians surveyed, nearly 15% had experienced job
discrimination because of their sexual orientation."
In light of such discrimination against gays, the California
Legislature has passed several bills within the past couple of years
Employment Law Issues Affecting Gay Men and Lesbians, 102 HARV. L REV. 1508, 1554 (1989);
Peter M. Cicchino, et. al, Comment, Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bil, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L L
REV. 549 (1991); Harris M. Miller, Comment, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984);
Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA.
L. REV. 773 (1988); Donna L Wise, Comment, Challenging Sexual Preference Discrimination in
Private Employment, 41 Oo ST. LJ. 501 (1980).
6. Martha Groves, Frequent Job Bias Leaves Little Recourse, Gays Say, L.A. TIMS, Oct.
5,1991, at Al.
7. Terry Friedman, AB 101-Discrimination in Employment: Fact Sheet (Jan. 28, 1991)
[hereinafter AB 101 Fact Sheet]; Terry Friedman, AB 101-Sexual Orientation Discrimination:
Summary of Representative Employment Cases (undated) [hereinafter Summary]; Tery Friedman,AB
101-Employer Issues (Mar. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Employer Issues]; AD 2601 Fact Sheet, supra note
5 (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
8. AD 2601 Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 3; AD 101 Fact Sheet, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Summary, supra note 7, at 1.
10. Id
11. See Groves, supra note 6, at Al.
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prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. " These gay civil
rights bills primarily focus on discrimination against homosexuals in
housing and employment. By taking such action, the Legislature has
acknowledged the existence of discrimination against homosexuals.
However, all but one of these bills, AB 2601, were vetoed by Cali-
fornia's Governor.13
Based upon the previously mentioned polls and studies, as well
as the Legislature's response within the past year or so, it is clear that
discrimination against homosexuals in housing and employment
exists. AB 2601 is the Legislature's first success in limiting such
discrimination.14 AB 2601 prohibits employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 5 However, unlike previous legislative
attempts, 16 AB 2601 does not address discrimination against homo-
12. See, e.g., A.B. 101, 1991-1992 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Dec. 4,1990) [hereinafter AB 101];
A.B. 2601, 1991-1992 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Feb. 11, 1992) [hereinafter AB 2601]; A.B. 3019,
1991-1992 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Feb. 19,1992) [hereinafter AB 3019]; A.B. 3825,1991-1992 Calif.
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mar. 2, 1992) [hereinafter AB 3825]. One other bill to protect homosexuals from
employment and housing discrimination, AB 1, was introduced back in 1982. A.B. 1, 1983-1984
Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Dec. 6, 1982) [hereinafter AB 1].
13. See California Governor Signs Legislation Barring Employment Discrimination Against
Gays, DAILY LAB. REP, Sept. 29, 1992, at All (mentioning that AB 3019, a measure largely
duplicative of AB 2601, was vetoed by Governor Wilson on September 25,1992); former Governor
George Deukmejian's veto message, reprinted in 97 LA. DAmLY J. 17 (Mar. 14, 1984); Stephen G.
Hirsch, Gay Rights Advocates Attack Wilson's Logic, RECORDER, Oct. 1, 1991, at 1 (analyzing
Governor Wilson's veto of AB 101); George Skelton, Wilson Signs Bill on Gay Job Rights, LA.
TMES, Sept. 26,1992, at Al (discussing Governor Pete Wilson's signing of AB 2601); Doug Willis,
Wilson Vetoes Civil Rights Bill That He Contends Goes Too Far, SACRAMNM BEE, Sept. 27, 1992,
at A3 (discussing Governor Wilson's veto of AB 3825). The enactment of AB 2601 may have
stemmed from the public's disagreement with Governor Wilson's veto of AB 101, a bill which would
have protected gays under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. A California poll released shortly
after the veto of AB 101 indicated that 62 percent of the California population thought Governor
Wilson should have signed AB 101, while only 29 percent believed Governor Wilson should have
vetoed AB 101. Jerry Roberts & Mae Kershner, Move Tuned to Beat Release of Poll Today, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 30,1991, at Al; cf. George Skelton, The Tines Poll; Gay-Rights Bill Veto Narrowly
Opposed in State, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6,1991, at Al (citing a statewide L.A. Times poll which found
that 46 percent of Californians disapproved of Governor Wilson's veto of AB 101, while 40 percent
approved of the veto of the bill).
14. The enactment of AB 2601 represents a great step forward for the gay civil rights
movement, and therefore warrants detailed discussion at a future point in this Comment. See infra
notes 245-283 and accompanying text.
15. 1992 Cal. Legis. Sere. ch. 915, sec. 2, at 3771 (West) (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE §
1102.1).
16. See, e.g., AB 3825 (which would have amended Government Code § 12955 to prohibit
discrimination in housing based on sexual orientation).
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sexuals in housing. The purpose of this Comment then is threefold:
(1) To explore the remedies available to homosexuals to combat
housing discrimination since AB 2601 has no application thereto; (2)
to delineate the history and development of California's protection of
gays from employment discrimination to aid the courts in their inter-
pretation and application of AB 2601; and (3) to argue for amend-
ments to the California Constitution and the Fair Employment and
Housing Act designed to afford homosexuals the same protection and
status enjoyed by other minorities subject to societal discrimination.
Part I of this Comment will analyze those protections afforded
homosexuals against sexual orientation discrimination in housing.17
Part II will discuss whether such protections are adequate.18 Part I
will focus on the history and development of protections against
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in both the
public sector and private sector.19 Part IV will address the inade-
quacy of these protections resulting in the enactment of AB 2601.20
Part V will discuss AB 2601 and its deficiencies.21 Part VI will
argue that further legislation is needed to equate the protection
accorded homosexuals with that conferred upon other minorities
against whom society also discriminates.22 Finally, Part VII will
conclude that the current law is only partially adequate to protect
gays from housing and employment discrimination.'
17. See infia notes 24-72 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 73-109 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 110-196 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 197-244 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 245-278 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 279-283 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 284-295 and accompanying text.
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I. PROTECTIONS AFFORDED HOMOSEXUALS AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
Protections against housing discrimination typically fall under the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),24 which consists of
laws and administrative procedures designed to address both employ-
ment and housing discrimination.2" While the FEHA protects
various minority groups, it has no application to homosexuals.26 The
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992). Under the FEHA, housing
discrimination:
[]ncludes refusal to sell, rent, or lease housing accommodations; includes refusal to
negotiate for the sale, rental or lease of housing accommodations; includes representation
that a housing accommodation is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such
housing accommodation is in fact so available; includes any other denial or withholding
of housing accommodations; includes provision of inferior terms, conditions privileges,
facilities, or services in connection with such housing accommodations; includes the
cancellation or termination of a sale or rental agreement; and includes the provision of
segregated or separated housing accommodations. The term "discrimination" does not
include refusal to rent or lease a portion of an owner-occupied single-family house to a
person as a roomer or boarder living within the household, provided that no more than
one roomer or boarder is to live within the household.
Id § 12927(c) (West 1992).
25. See Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65,72, 801 P.2d 373,376,276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1990),
in which the court stated:
The California Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) was enacted in 1959 and recodified
in 1980 in conjunction with the Rumford Fair Housing Act to form the [Fair Employment
and Housing Act] FEHA. The law establishes that freedom from job discrimination on
specified grounds, including sex, is a civil right. It declares that such discrimination is
against public policy and an unlawful employment practice. The statute creates two
administrative bodies: the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (Department),
whose function is to investigate, conciliate, and seek redress of claimed discrimination,
and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (Commission), which performs
adjudicatory and rulemaking functions. An aggrieved person may file a complaint with
the Department, which must promptly investigate. If the Department deems a claim valid,
it seeks to resolve the matter in confidence by conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
If that fails or seems inappropriate, the Department may issue an accusation to be heard
by the Commission. The Department acts as prosecutor on the accusation and argues the
complainant's case before the Commission. If no accusation is issued within 150 days
after the filing of a complaint, or if the Department earlier determines not to prosecute the
case and the matter is not otherwise resolved, the Department must give the complainant
a "right to sue" letter. Only then may that person bring a civil suit [under the FEHA].
Id (citations omitted). See generally 8 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALUORNIA LAw, Constitutional
Law, §§ 756-70 (9th ed. 1988).
26. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79-80, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138. The FEHA proscribes
discrimination based on the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap,
medical condition, marital status, or sex of any person. See CA. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992)
545
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FEHA protects only those persons who fall within the categories
specifically enumerated in the statute.' Since sexual orientation is
not an enumerated category, the FEHA does not protect homosexuals
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 28 As a
result, homosexuals have had to turn to the Unruh Civil Rights
Act,29 a more general anti-discrimination law, for protection from
housing discrimination."
A. Are Homosexuals Protected Under the Unruh Act?
On its face, the Unruh Civil Rights Act does not safeguard
persons who are discriminated against because of their sexual orien-
tation. The Unruh Civil Rights Act states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or
blindness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
31
(prohibiting discrimination based on these factors).
27. Roo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d at 381,276 Cal. Rptr. at 138; see CAL GOV'T CODE §
12955 (West 1992) (proscribing housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, marital
status, national origin, or ancestry).
28. Roo, 52 Cal. 3d at 80, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
29. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1992).
30. Memorandum prepared by Lobby for Individual Freedom and Equality, The Heart ofAB
101: Prohibiting Employment Discrimination (Sept. 6,1991) [hereinafter The Heart ofAB 101] (copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal). In reality there may be little difference between the FEHA and
the Unruh Act, since the Unruh Act prohibits the same types of housing discrimination as does the
FEHA. Id. at 1-2. However, the Unruh Act has been applied to include sexual orientation as a
protected class whereas the FEHA has not Id at 1. Additionally, under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff
need not exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing, but instead may choose to go directly to a court which can impose greater penalties for
discrimination under the Unruh Act than are available under the FEHA. Id at 1-2. Even if a claimant
does not wish to go to court, he or she may still complain to the Department of Fair Employment
and Housing which can apply the same remedies available to claimants under the FEHA. 1,R at 1.
31. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1992).
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There is no mention of sexual orientation. Nevertheless, California
courts have held that certain persons not specifically listed in the
Unruh Civil Rights Act are still subject to its protections.32
In Stoumen v. Reilly,33 the California Supreme Court examined
whether homosexuals, although not specifically enumerated within
California's then-existing civil rights law (which would later become
the Unruh Civil Rights Act), were nonetheless protected.34 In
Stoumen, the State Board of Equalization had suspended indefinitely
the liquor license of a restaurant claiming that the "plaintiff permitted
his premises to be used as a disorderly house for purposes injurious
to public morals" in violation of section 58 of the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Acf. 5 The more apparent reason for loss of the liquor
license was due to homosexual patronage.3 6 The court in Stoumen
rejected the notion that mere patronage of a bar and restaurant by
homosexuals was illegal, and held that all persons of lawful age have
a legal right to patronize a public restaurant and bar provided they act
properly and do not commit illegal or immoral acts.37 The court
stated that if the proprietor of a bar or restaurant excludes a patron
without good cause, the proprietor is liable in damages under Cali-
fornia Civil Code sections 51 and 52.3' Read broadly, Stoumen
established that homosexuals are protected under what is now the
32. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text (describing the manner in which courts have
expanded the Unruh Act to include sexual orientation).
33. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
34. Id. at 716,234 P.2d at 971. The case was not decided under the Unruh Civil Rights Act
because the Unruh Act had not yet been enacted; see 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1866, sec. 1, at 4424
(enacting the Unruh Civil Rights Act); infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of the Stoumen holding to the Unruh Act).
35. Stoumen, 37 Cal. 2d at 714-15, 234 P.2d at 970. The State Board of Equalization also
justified its license suspension on the grounds that plaintiff's employees had sold alcohol to a minor
in violation of § 61(a) of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. Id
36. Id at 715, 234 P.2d at 970.
37. Id at 716,234 P.2d at 971. The California Supreme Court took issue with the conclusion
of the State Board of Equalization that homosexuality is "injurious to public morals" in and of itself.
Id The court reasoned that patronage of a public restaurant by homosexuals was not "injurious to
public morals" without the additional showing of some kind of illegal or immoral act perpetrated by
any of the homosexuals at the restaurant. Id
38. I ; see 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 413, sec. 1-2, at 553 (enacting CAL CIV. CODE §§ 51-52).
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Unruh Civil Rights Act from arbitrary discrimination in public
accommodations.39
Since Stoumen was decided in 1951, before the enactment of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, the decision was based on the then-existing
civil rights law as codified in California Civil Code sections 51 and
52.40 However, in reliance on the Stoumen holding that homosexuals
are protected from arbitrary discrimination under Civil Code sections
51 and 52, subsequent decisions have interpreted the Unruh Civil
Rights Act as extending protection to homosexuals.41
For example, in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy
Scouts ofAmerica,42 a case in which the plaintiff claimed he was
expelled from the Boy Scouts because of his sexual orientation, the
court stated "[i]n Stoumen v. Reilly... our Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Unruh Act prohibits the exclusion of a person on the
basis of homosexual status. 43 In light of Stoumen, the court in
Curran held that the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination
against homosexuals." Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange45 is the
most recent case to affirm this proposition.
39. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 214, 474 P.2d 992, 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1970).
40. Stoumen, 37 Cal. 2d at 716, 234 P.2d at 971.
41. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 215-16, 474 P.2d at 998, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (including
homosexuality within the Unruh Act). Subsequent cases have also advanced this interpretation; see,
e.g., Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 291, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (1984) (holding that
the listing of discriminations in California Civil Code § 51 is not exclusive, and therefore a lesbian
couple refused service in a semiprivate booth at a restaurant which had a policy of allowing seating
in such booths only by twb people of opposite sex was entitled, under municipal ordinance
precluding discrimination in business practices, to preliminary injunction enjoining the restaurant from
continuing its seating policy).
42. 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983). Timothy Curran was a member of the
Boy Scouts of America for over five years and had attained the rank of Eagle Scout. Id at 718, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 328. He applied for the position of "Scouter" in November of 1980, but was informed
shortly thereafter that his application to be a Scouter was rejected, and furthermore that he was
expelled from the Boy Scouts for being homosexual. Id The court held that the Boy Scouts of
America is a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act, that the Unruh Act
prohibits arbitrary discrimination against homosexuals, and that therefore Timothy Curran had a cause
of action for violation of the Unruh Act. Id at 733-34, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
43. Id at 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
44. Id at 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (relying on Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713,234 P.2d
969 (1951) and Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,595
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979)).
45. 6 Cal. App. 4th 1455, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992).
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In Beaty, the court held that an insurer did not violate the Unruh
Act when it refused to offer a cohabitating homosexual couple the
same insurance policy at the same premium that the company offered
to married couples. 6 The court stated that the issue was plaintiffs'
marital status, not their homosexuality.47 The court refused to
expand the Unruh Act to include unmarried couples, and therefore
held that an insurance company may discriminate against unmarried
couples.48 In so holding, however, the court also stated that an
insurer may not discriminate based on one's homosexuality since the
Unruh Act forbids discrimination against a person on the basis of
sexual orientation.49 Therefore, homosexuals, although not ex-pressly
mentioned in the Unruh Act, are likely protected thereunder. The
issue then remains whether the Unruh Act applies to housing
discrimination.
B. Housing and the Unruh Act
The Unruh Civil Rights Act applies to "all business estab-
lishments of every kind whatsoever."5" In light of this broad
language, courts have interpreted the Unruh Act as including busi-
nesses dealing with housing. 1 Such an interpretation therefore
allows the Unruh Act to be used to prohibit housing discrimination
against homosexuals. The history of the Act sheds better light on this
construction.
The Unruh Act's predecessor5 2 proscribed the denial of access
to places such as "inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses, barber
shops, bath houses, theaters, skating-rinks and other places of public
46. IL at 1459, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595.
47. Id at 1461, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
48. 1&. at 1462, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
49. IM at 1460, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
50. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1992).
51. Courts have held that the "business establishments" clause includes the development,
construction, rental, and sale of real estate and apartment complexes. Steven B. Arbuss, The Unruh
Civil Rights Act: An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 UCLA L. REv. 443 nn.52, 55 (1983). "
52. 1897 Cal. Stat. ch. 108, see. 1-2, at 137 (creating civil rights protections which through
subsequent amendments became the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
549
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accommodation or amusement" on the basis of color or race.53 This
provision was codified in 1905 as California Civil Code sections 51
and 52, which remained substantially unchanged until 1959.51
In 1959, Civil Code sections 51 and 52 were altered, forming
what is now the Unruh Civil Rights Act.55 A key amendment con-
cerned the replacement of the list of places enumerated in section 51,
which included inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, barber shops,
bath houses, theaters, skating rinks, public conveyances, and places
where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind were sold for consumption
on the premises, with the phrase "all business establishments of any
kind whatsoever." 56 The purpose of this amendment was to reverse
the restrictive interpretation courts had employed in the mid 1950's
in determining what places were covered within inns, restaurants,
hotels, eating houses, barber shops, bath houses, theaters, skating
rinks, public conveyances, and places where ice cream or soft drinks
of any kind were sold for consumption on the premises."7 This his-
tory demonstrates that the California Legislature intended a more
expansive reading than courts were utilizing so as to increase the
number of places covered by the Unruh Act.5"
In light of this history, the California Supreme Court applied a
more expansive interpretation in defining what places were overed
53. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1150-51,805 P.2d 873, 875-76,
278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 616-17 (1991).
54. 1905 Cal. Stat. ch. 413, sec. 1-2, at 553 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52); Harris, 52
Cal. 3d at 1151, 805 P.2d at 876,278 Cal. Rptr. at 617. Section 51 was amended in 1919 and 1923
adding additional places to those listed. 1919 Cal. Stat. ch. 210, sec. 1, at 309; 1923 Cal. Stat. ch.
235, sec. 1, at 485 (adding "public conveyances" and "places where ice cream or soft drinks of any
kind are sold for consumption on the premises" to "inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, barber
shops, bath houses, theaters, skating rinks, and all other places of public accommodation or
amusement").
55. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1866, sec. 1, at 4424 (enacting the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
56. Id.
57. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 214, 474 P.2d 992, 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1970). Several
cases limited the application of Civil Code §§ 51 and 52. See, e.g., Reed v. Hollywood Professional
Sch., 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 890, 338 P.2d 633, 636 (1959) (private school not a place of
public accommodation or amusement); Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 833, 836,
305 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1957) (dentist's office not a place of public accommodation or amusement);
Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 329, 27 P.2d 945, 946 (1955)
(cemetery not a place of public accommodation or amusement); see also Arbuss, supra note 51, at
443, 450 n.37 (listing the cases which limited the application of §§ 51 and 52).
58, Arbuss, supra note 51, at 445.
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by the Unruh Civil Rights Act in its decision in Marina Point, Ltd v.
Wolfson.59 In Marina Point, an apartment complex refused to rent
any of its apartments to people with minor children?' A family with
minor children contended that the landlord's discrimination against
families with children was an arbitrary form of discrimination and
violated the Unruh Act.61 The Marina Point court agreed.62
Relying on prior appellate cases, the court in Marina Point
explained that for nearly two decades the provisions of the Unruh
Act, in light of its broad application to all business establishments,
had been applicable with full force to the business of renting housing
accommodations.63 The court also stated that even though the land-
lord would normally be subject to California's Fair Housing Law, the
Unruh Act was also applicable. 4 Thus, the effect of Marina Point
was to include housing within the definition of "business estab-
lishment" under the Unruh Act. This in turn allowed application of
the Unruh Act to bar housing discrimination.
As previously mentioned, homosexuals are probably included
within the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 65 Since the Act applies to
housing discrimination, it follows that homosexuals may invoke the
Unruh Act to combat housing discrimination. This reasoning was
affirmed and solidified in Hubert v. Williams.6
C. Hubert v. Williams: Judicial Recognition of the Prohibition
Against Sexual Orientation Housing Discrimination
In Hubert, the plaintiff, a quadriplegic, hired a lesbian nurse as
his 24-hour attendant. 67 The plaintiff was then evicted from his
59. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
60. Id. at 727, 640 P.2d at 118, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
61. Id. at 730, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
62. Id. at 726, 640 P.2d at 117, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
63. Id. at 731,640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (citing Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App.
2d 685, 694-95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286, 291-92 (1962), and Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 242, 254-55, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 317 (1962)).
64. Id at 731 n.5., 640 P.2d at 121 n-5, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502 n.5.
65. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
66. 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982).
67. Id at 3, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
apartment for having a live-in lesbian nurse, and for associating with
homosexual persons.6 8 The Appellate Department of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County held that, under the Unruh Act, land-
lords may not refuse to rent an apartment to a homosexual solely
because of the potential tenant's sexual preference.69 In its analysis,
the court first determined that the definition of "business estab-
lishment" under the Unruh Act included rental housing.7" Next, the
Hubert court concluded, based on several cases interpreting the
Unruh Act, that homosexuals are a class protected by the Unruh
Act.7' Therefore, the court reasoned, homosexuals are protected
from arbitrary discrimination in rental housing by the Unruh Act.72
To date, Hubert is the only appellate case which directly deals with
housing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under the
Unruh Act.
It remains to be seen whether other courts will adopt the
reasoning and holding of Hubert and validate the protection against
housing discrimination. Nonetheless, Hubert illustrates that some
protection against housing discrimination does exist for homosexuals
in at least one California court.
II. ADEQUACY OF PROTECTIONS AGAINST
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
The leading cases dealing with housing discrimination against
homosexuals have been decided at the intermediate appellate
level.7 3 As a result, these cases do not provide the necessary pro-
tection from housing discrimination that a supreme court decision
68. I
69. Id.
70. Id (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496 (1982), and Burks v. Poppy Const. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463,370 P.2d 313,20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962)).
71. Id at 5, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (citing Marina Point, Utd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640
P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982), Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979), In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205,474 P.2d 992,
90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970), Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951), and Orloff v. Los
Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951)).
72. Id, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 164. Pertaining to the second ground for the plaintiff's eviction, the
court stated that the right to associate with homosexuals is also protected under the Unruh Act. Id.
73. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (listing those cases).
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would provide. However, in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors
XIV,7" a recent case interpreting the Unruh Act, the California
Supreme Court seemed to imply that homosexuals were within the
scope of the Unruh Act and subject to its protections.7" Therefore,
a broad reading of Harris may fortify certain appellate decisions
suggesting that homosexuals may have some protection from housing
discrimination under the Unruh Act.
A. Intermediate Appellate Decisions: Lack of Binding Authority
The decisions protecting homosexuals against housing discri-
mination are of diminished usefulness because of their status as
appellate court decisions. They lack the more pervasive and
permanent precedential authority of decisions by the state supreme
court. Stoumen v. Reilly,7" one of the few California Supreme Court
cases dealing with discrimination against homosexuals, only con-
cerned patronage at a bar and restaurant, not housing discri-
mination.77 The Stoumen opinion never explicitly stated that homo-
sexuals were incorporated into the Unruh Civil Rights Act, or pro-
tected from housing discrimination under the Unruh Act. Although
the Unruh Act has subsequently been found to apply to housing,78
the court in Stoumen never explicitly acknowledged such an inter-
pretation. Applying a narrow interpretation, the court simply held that
homosexuals could patronize a bar and restaurant provided that they
act properly and do not commit illegal or immoral acts.79 Thus,
Stoumen provides little direct support for homosexuals faced with
housing discrimination.
74. 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 805 P.2d 873, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1991).
75. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (postulating that homosexuality is a
personal characteristic and therefore protected by the Unruh Act).
76. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
77. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing Stoumen in connection with the
Unruh Act).
78. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Unruh Act's application to
housing discrimination).
79. Stoumen, 37 Cal. 2d at 716, 234 P.2d at 971; see supra note 37 and accompanying text
(stating that all persons of lawful age have a legal right to patronize a public restaurant and bar
provided they act properly and do not commit illegal or immoral acts).
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The decisions which have implied sexual orientation into the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, Hubert v. Williams,"0 Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts ofAmerica,1 Rolon v. Kul-
witzky,8 2 and Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange 3 are all inter-
mediate appellate decisions of the Court of Appeal for the Second
and/or Third District. The most important of the four cases, Hubert,
which held that homosexuals are protected from arbitrary discri-
mination in housing, is actually a decision by the Appellate
Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County which is an
intermediate branch of the Court of Appeal for the Second District
with little precedential authority. 4
Under technical principles of stare decisis, no California appellate
court is bound to follow these prior decisions." The courts of appeal
or the supreme court may look to the prior decisions of the Second
District or Third District for guidance as to whether homosexuals are
protected by the Unruh Act, but such courts are not compelled to
follow any of the decisions.8 6 In fact, a different panel of the Court
of Appeal for the Second District or the Third District may choose
not to follow its district's prior decisions, but instead may disapprove
them. 7 Since there is no supreme court opinion binding all of the
courts in California, the previously mentioned appellate opinions
protecting homosexuals are subject to reversal or revision by the
California Supreme Court or any one of the courts of appeal.88
Consequently, the California Supreme Court or any of the courts of
appeal could rule that homosexuals are not included within the Unruh
80. 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982); see supra notes 67-72 and
accompanying text (discussing Hubert).
81. 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983); see supra notes 42-44 and
accompanying text (discussing Curran).
82. 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984); see supra note 41 (discussing Rolon).
83. 6 Cal. App. 4th 1455, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992); see supra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text (discussing Beaty).
84. See 9 B.E. WrmN, CALrFoRNIA CIVi PROCEDURE, Appeal § 777 (3d ed. 1985)
(discussing The authority of decisions by appellate departments).
85. See id- at § 772 (discussing the authority of decisions by courts of appeal).
86. See id
87. Id
88. See id at §§ 768 (discussing the binding authority of the California Supreme Court).
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Civil Rights Act, thereby negating any current protection homo-
sexuals enjoy against housing discrimination.
The California Legislature could resolve any doubt as to whether
homosexuals are protected from housing discrimination by amending
either the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Fair Employment and
Housing Act to explicitly include sexual orientation. The Legislature
has failed to so amend either act despite a recent amendment to the
Unruh Civil Rights Act adding the category of "blindness or other
physical disability" to the statute. 9 Cognizant of this unwillingness
to amend either statute, it would certainly be helpful if the California
Supreme Court would strengthen the protection for homosexuals
against housing discrimination by expressly holding that sexual
orientation is a protected category within the Unruh Act. This would
at least prevent the intermediate courts of appeal from disagreeing
with prior holdings protecting homosexuals. As of yet, the California
Supreme Court has declined to explicitly include homosexuals within
the Unruh Act,9° but the court may have implicitly included homo-
sexuals within the Unruh Act in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors
XIV.91
B. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV: Implicit Protection
for Homosexuals
In Harris, the court held that a landlord's minimum income
policy did not violate the Unruh Act, although that policy arbitrarily
discriminated on the basis of economic factors.' The court refused
to extend the protections of the Unruh Act to include economic
criteria."3 The Harris court also limited the application of the Unruh
89. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 159, sec. 1, at 1094 (amending CAL Civ. CODE § 51).
90. In the most recent case dealing with sexual orientation and the Unruh Act, the California
Supreme Court denied review on August 27, 1992. Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1455,
8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1992).
91. 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 805 P.2d 873, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1991).
92. IA at 1169, 805 P.2d at 889, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
93. Ia at 1148, 805 P.2d at 874, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
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Act by holding that a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination
to sustain an action under the Unruh Act.94
The plaintiffs in Harris, who were prospective tenants in
defendant's apartment complex, filed suit complaining that the
defendant's policy requiring a prospective tenant to earn at least three
times the apartment's monthly rent (the minimum income policy)
violated the Unruh Act.95 In deciding whether discrimination based
on economic characteristics was prohibited by the Unruh Act, the
court looked to prior decisions interpreting the Unruh Act, and the
language of the statute, to distill the common thread that all the
protected categories involve personal characteristics.96 As a result,
the Harris court concluded that only classifications based on personal
characteristics are protected by the Unruh Act, and those which
involve economic characteristics are not protected by the Unruh
Act.97 Since a minimum income policy discriminates on the basis of
economic characteristics rather than personal characteristics, the
plaintiffs were not in a class protected by the Unruh Act.98
In light of the above reasoning, the question arises whether homo-
sexuality is a personal characteristic, and thus is included within the
Unruh Act. If homosexuality is a personal characteristic, then under
the reasoning of Harris, courts should conclude that homosexuality
is included within the Unruh Civil Rights Act.99 Harris describes a
personal characteristic as "a person's geographical origin, physical
attributes, and personal beliefs."100 If homosexuality is genetic,
94. Id at 1175, 805 P.2d at 893, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
95. Id at 1149-50, 805 P.2d at 875, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
96. Id at 1160, 805 P.2d at 883, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
97. Id at 1161-62, 805 P.2d at 884, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
98. Id at 1169,805 P.2d at 889,278 Cal. Rptr. at 630. The plaintiffs in Harris also attempted
to rely on the stated category of "sex" within the Unruh Act as a basis on which to challenge the
minimum income policy. Id at 1170, 805 P.2d at 889, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 630. The court, however,
held that there is no sex discrimination despite the policy's disparate impact on women because the
Unruh Act only applies to intentional discrimination. IM at 1175, 805 P.2d at 893, 278 Cal. Rptr. at
634.
99. Classifications based on personal characteristics, as opposed to economic characteristics,
are protected by the Unruh Act. Id at 1161, 805 P.2d at 884, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
100. IM at 1160, 805 P.2d at 883, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
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then it is surely a physical attribute.1"' If homosexuality is a social
choice, then it is surely a personal belief. Whether one concludes that
homosexuality is genetic or a product of choice, homosexuality is
probably a personal characteristic and therefore, per Harris, a pro-
tected category under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
In addition, although Harris did not involve discrimination
against homosexuals, and was more restrictive than past decisions
construing the Unruh Act, the decision may have implicitly conceded
that homosexuality is protected by the Unruh Act. The court stated
that beginning with In re Cox10 2 in 1970, the Unruh Act had been
construed to apply to several classifications not expressly enumerated
in the statute. 103 In making this contention, the court referred to
101. Traditional psychology has held that homosexuality is a social phenomenon triggered by
a troubled parent-child relationship where the mother is overly protective or the father is distant or
perhaps even hostile. Christine Gorman, Are Gay Men Born That Way?, TIME, Sept. 9, 1991, at 60.
However, recent studies seem to indicate that homosexuality may have a genetic cause instead. Jean
L. Griffim, Twins Study Suggests Sex Preference Genetic, CHm. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1991, Du Page, at 1.
In 1990, researchers from the Netherlands discovered that the portion of the hypothalamus (a
component of the brain) which controls daily rhythms was twice as large in homosexual men relative
to heterosexual men. Id In August of 1991, Simon Levay, a researcher at the Salk Institute in San
Diego, found that another region of the hypothalamus, an area which regulates sexual activity, was
nearly three times smaller in homosexual men than in heterosexual men. Curt Suplee, Brain May
Determine Sexuality, WASH. PosT, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al. Additionally, the research discovered that
the size of this region was nearly exact in both homosexual men and heterosexual women. Id In a
report published in December of 1991, Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard added strong support to
the idea that homosexuality is genetically based in concluding that 30 percent to 70 percent of male
homosexuality is caused by genetic factors. Richard A. Knox, New Study of Twins Finds Genetic
Basis for Homosexuality, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1991, at 20. In interviewing identical twins,
fraternal twins, and adoptive brothers, the researchers discovered that if one of the genetically exact
identical twin brothers was gay, them was a 52 percent chance that the other would be gay. Id. If one
of the fraternal twins was gay, there was a 22 percent chance that the other would be gay. l As for
the genetically unrelated adoptive brothers, if one of the adoptive brothers was homosexual, there was
only an 11 percent chance that the other would be homosexual as well, which is usually the normal
rate of homosexuality in a given population. L; see also Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual
Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAW & SExuALrrY 133, 140 n.23
(1991) (stating that about 10% of the United States population is homosexual). Consequently, science
is rapidly approaching the conclusion that sexual orientation is, in reality, a genetic trait, as opposed
to a social phenomenon. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, Are Some People Born Gay?, N.Y.
TIES, Dec. 17, 1991, at A21; see also Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male
Sexual Orientation, 48 ARcH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991) (scientifically describing the method
and results of the twins study).
102. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
103. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1155, 805 P.2d at 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
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Rolon,0 4 Curran,10 5 and Hubert, 106 all of which stated that
homosexuality was protected by the Unruh Act."°7 By expressing
no disagreement with prior interpretations incorporating homo-
sexuality into the Unruh Act, the Harris court presumably agreed
with such inclusion. 0 8 However, such a contention offers less
comfort than an express holding by the California Supreme Court that
sexual orientation is included within the Unruh Act.
Consequently, homosexuals may have some protection against
housing discrimination under the Unruh Act. Intermediate appellate
court decisions establish such protection, and a broad reading of
Harris appears to affirm these decisions. Harris at least provides the
argument that homosexuality is included within the Unruh Act
because homosexuality is a personal characteristic. 9
I-II. PROTECTIONS AFFORDED HOMOSEXUALS AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
The fact that homosexuals may be implicitly protected by the
Unruh Civil Rights Act regarding housing discrimination furnishes
no protection in the area of employment discrimination. 0 Since
the Fair Employment Housing Act (FEHA) supposedly has exclusive
jurisdiction over employment discrimination, the Unruh Civil Rights
Act has no application to, nor offers any protection against, such
discrimination."' The FEHA bars discrimination only on the
104. See supra note 41 (discussing Rolon).
105. See supra notes 442-44 and accompanying text (discussing Curran).
106. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing Hubert).
107. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1155, 805 P.2d at 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. 620.
108. See Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1455, 1462, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 593, 600
(1992) (stating that the Harris court refused to overrule prior case law which extended the Unruh Act
to classifications not expressed in the statute).
109. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Unruh Act's limitation to
categories based on personal characteristics).
110. According to the Fair Employment and Housing Act, employment discrimination against
a person occurs when an employer (1) Refuses to hire or employ a person; (2) refuses to select the
person for a training program leading to employment; (3) bars or discharges the person from
employment; (4) bars or discharges the person from a training program leading to employment; or
(5) discriminates against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment CAL. GOV'T CODE. § 12940 (West 1992).
111. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 77, 801 P.2d 373, 380, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 137 (1990).
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grounds specified in the statute, which does not include sexual
orientation.11 2 Unlike the Unruh Act which may incorporate classes
not specifically enumerated therein, the scope of the FEHA is limited
to those categories expressly listed in the statute. 13 As a result,
under the FEHA, a homosexual does not enjoy the same civil right
from employment discrimination as does a handicapped person or a
divorced person who is expressly included within the statute."1
Consequently, courts have had to look elsewhere to find pro-
tections for homosexuals from job discrimination; most notably the
Labor Code. Codifying the courts' interpretation of the Labor Code,
the California Legislature, with the signature of the Governor,
recently enacted AB 2601 which markedly improved the protection
afforded homosexuals against employment discrimination. '15 It
would be helpful to explore the history preceding AB 2601 in order
to appreciate its importance as well as to facilitate its interpretation
and application by the courts.
A. Public Sector Employment
In the public sector, homosexuals were protected to some extent
against discrimination in employment by the California Constitution,
California Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102, Executive Order B-
54-79, and California Government Code section 18500, which inde-
pendently provide a legal basis upon which to sue for such dis-
112. Id. at 79-80, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138; see supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text (discussing the FEHA and stating that the FEHA prohibits discrimination based
on race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital
status, or sex).
113. Roo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79-80, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
114. See CAL- GOV'T CODE § 12921 (West 1992).
115. This new legislation appears to be in accord with society's wish that homosexuals have
equal rights in the workplace. For example, a Newsweek Poll conducted in September of 1992 "found
that an overwhelming 78% of the public believes gay men and women should enjoy the same access
to job opportunities as heterosexuals." Bill Turque et al., Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14,
1992, at 35-36. In a recent Gallup Poll, 75% of those polled said that they thought gays should have
equal employment opportunities. Elaine Herscher, "Family Values" Rhetoric: Gays Under Fire in
Presidential Race, S.F. CHRON., June 26, 1992, at Al. In addition, a nationwide poll found that 80%
of Americans favored equal rights for homosexuals in the workplace. Jorge Casuso, Gays, Lesbians
Shift Focus to Civil Rights-and Win, CI. Tnm., Apr. 30, 1991, at 1.
559
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
crimination.' 6 The two most important protections, the California
Constitution and Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102, emanated from
the seminal case in the area of employment discrimination against
homosexuals, Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Company."7
1. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Company: Origins of Protectionfor
Homosexuals from Job Discrimination
In Gay Law Students, the plaintiffs, four individuals and two
associations, organized to promote equal rights for homosexuals,
filed a class action against Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PT&T),
challenging its arbitrary discrimination in the hiring, firing, and
promotion of homosexual employees."1 8 The California Supreme
Court sustained a cause of action to a demurrer based on three
separate areas of the law: The equal protection clause of the
California Constitution; section 453(a) of the Public Utilities Code;
and Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102.119
a Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause of California is contained in Article
I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution. It states,
"[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."' 20 In
116. See infra notes 118-144 and accompanying text. -
117. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
118. Id. at 463,595 P.2d at 595, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The complaint also challenged the Fair
Employment Practices Commission's assertion that it had no jurisdiction over claims involving
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id at 464, 595 P.2d at 595, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
119. d at 466-67,486-87,595 P.2d at 597,609-10, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19,31-32; see also Lee
A. Johnson, Note, Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co:
Constitutional and Statutory Restraints on Employment Discrimination Against Homosexuals by
Public Utilities, 68 CAL. L. REV. 680 (1980) (discussing and analyzing the decision in Gay Law
Students). Of the three areas of the law discussed by the court, the equal protection clause and the
Labor Code are the most relevant to this Comment since they can be applied generally, whereas §
453 of the Public Utilities Code is limited to public utilities.
120. • CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
560
1993 / Gay Civil Rights
Gay Law Students, the court held that the equal protection clause
prohibits a public entity from engaging in arbitrary employment dis-
crimination."' The court reasoned that the equal protection clause
of the state constitution prohibits a state or governmental entity from
arbitrarily discriminating against any class of persons, including
homosexuals, in employment.12 The court then stated that although
the breadth of California's equal protection clause was not intended
to include all purely private conduct, since PT&T was technically a
privately owned enterprise, PT&T would nonetheless fall within the
equal protection clause because a "public utility is in many respects
more akin to a governmental entity than to a purely private
employer."' 23 The court based this conclusion on the extensive
regulatory scheme and the state-sanctioned monopoly status of a
public utility. 2 4 Consequently, the court held that a state-protected
public utility, a quasi-public employer, cannot arbitrarily or invi-
diously discriminate in its employment decisions under Article I,
section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.125 The
holding of Gay Law Students was important since it provided homo-
sexuals a constitutional basis upon which to state a cause of action for
discrimination by a public or quasi-public employer.
b. Labor Code Sections 1101 and 1102: Sexual Orientation
as a Political Activity
The court in Gay Law Students also permitted a cause of action
for employment discrimination based on sexual orientation under
121. Gay Law StudentsAss'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 467,595 P.2d at 597, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (citing
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. California, 71 CaL 2d 566,456 P.2d 645,79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969); Morrison
v. Board of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); Kotch v. Pilot Cormm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947)).
122. Id at 467,595 P.2d at 597, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
123. Id. at 468-69,595 P.2d at 598-99, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21 (citing Kruger v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974)).
124. I& at 469-71, 595 P.2d at 599-600, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
125. Id at 474, 595 P.2d at 602, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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California Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102.126 The court indi-
cated that the two sections were designed to defend the fundamental
right of employees to engage in political activity without interference
by employers.127 The court noted that an employer cannot coerce
an employee on threat of discharge to adopt, follow, or refrain from
adopting a political activity, nor can an employer foster a policy
forbidding employees to engage in political activities or attempting
to control those activities. 128 The court also stated that the concept
of "employee" includes job applicants since otherwise employers
could circumvent the Legislature's goal of protecting citizens by
merely advancing the discriminatory practices to an earlier stage in
the employment relationship if job applicants were not protected.129
Thus, one result of Gay Law Students was that employees as well as
applicants were able to use Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 as a
defense to discriminatory hiring practices by an employer.
Adopting the reasoning of the appellate court in Mallard v.
Boring,"' the California Supreme Court in Gay Law Students
126. lId at 486-87, 595 P2d at 609-10, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32. Labor Code § 1101 states:
"[n]o employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy: (a) Forbidding or
preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics or from becoming candidates for
public office; (b) Controlling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities or
affiliations of employees." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1989). Labor Code § 1102 states: "[n]o
employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by
means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or
following any particular course or line of political action or political activity." Id § 1102 (West
1989).
127. Gay Law SudentsAssn, 24 Cal. 3d at 487,595 P.2d at 610,156 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (quoting
Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331,335,392 P.2d 385,387,38 Cal. Rptr. 625,627 (1964)),
128. Id at 487,595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102).
129. Id at 487 n.16, 595 P.2d at 610 n.16, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.16 (citing California State
Restaurant Ass'n v. Whitlow, 58 Cal. App. 3d 340, 347, 129 Cal. Rptr. 824, 828 (1976); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Labor Bd., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
130. 182 Cal. App. 2d 390,6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960). In Mallard, the plaintiff, a stenographer,
sued for wrongful inducement of breach of contract and for wrongful discharge from employment.
Id at 392i 6 Cal. Rptr. at 172. The plaintiff responded to a court questionnaire by indicating that she
was available for jury duty despite her employers order not to so indicate. Id at 392, 6 Cal. Rptr.
at 173. Plaintiff was subsequently discharged from her employment. lI at 393, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
The court held that there was no cause of action for wrongfully inducing a breach of contract. Id at
394, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174. In her second cause of action, plaintiff argued that service as a trial juror
was a political activity protected by Labor Code § 1101 and that violation of this section by her
employer was grounds for a claim of wrongful discharge. Id at 394-95, 6 Cal. Rptr. 174. The court
stated that political activity connoted the espousal of a candidate or cause, and some degree of action
to promote the acceptance thereof by other persons. Id at 395, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174. The court then
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defined political activity as "the espousal of a candidate or a cause,
and some degree of action to promote the acceptance thereof by other
persons."13 1 Using this standard, the court concluded that the
struggle for equal rights by homosexuals in such areas as employ-
ment must be a "political activity" because homosexuals attempt to
persuade others in society that gays deserve the same fundamental
rights as everyone else. 132 To so convince others in society, a
homosexual must manifest his or her homosexuality since such open
conduct is a necessary step in encouraging other homosexuals to
associate in the struggle for equal rights. 133 The court then stated
that by discriminating against manifest homosexual persons,
employers tend to dissuade such political activity in violation of the
prohibitions of sections 1101 and 1102 of the Labor Code. 134
According to the Gay Law Students court, PT&T's policy of discri-
minating against manifest homosexuals was a policy tending to
control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees in
violation of Labor Code section 1101.135 Furthermore, in violation
of section 1102, PT&T also had attempted to coerce and influence its
employees to refrain from adopting a particular course or line of
political activity, namely manifesting homosexuality. 136 Conse-
quently, the court found that a cause of action against PT&T was
justified under both Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102.137
As a result of Gay Law Students, state agencies, departments,
boards and commissions were prohibited from discriminating against
homosexuals because of (1) California's equal protection clause and
stated that jury service was not a political activity because jury service is a judicial function which
is repugnant to the concept of political activity. Id, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174-75. Consequently, the court
held that there also was no cause of action for wrongful discharge from employmenL Id at 396, 6
Cal. Rptr. at 175.
131. Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 487,595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (quoting
Mallard, 182 Cal. App. 2d at 395, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174).
132. Id at 488, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
133. Id at 488, 595 P.2d at 610-11, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
134. Id at 488, 595 P.2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id. at 489, 595 P.2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
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(2) California Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102.13 These two
protections were of immense importance for they were the foundation
for all subsequent protection accorded homosexuals against job dis-
crimination. However, there were other protections against public
sector employment discrimination which deserve mentioning.
2. Executive Order B-54-79: The Governor'sAttempt to
Ban Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Executive Order B-54-79, signed by former Governor Jerry
Brown on April 4, 1979, proscribed sexual orientation employment
discrimination in the public sector. 139 The order forbade the
agencies, departments, boards and commissions within the executive
branch of state government from discriminating in state employment
against any individual based solely upon the individual's sexual
preference. 140 Former Attorney General George Deukmejian
endorsed the legality of this order, concluding that such an executive
order was not an improper infringement upon legislative authority in
regard to the state civil service. 14' The Legislature subsequently
codified Governor Brown's executive order in 1988.
3. California Government Code Section 18500: The
Legislature's Codification of the Governor's Ban
California Government Code section 18500 was amended in 1988
to include sexual orientation, along with other categories, as a basis
138. See 63 CEL Op. Atty Gen. 583 (1980); see also 66 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 486 (1983)
(reinforcing this result by concluding that in addition to state agencies, local public agencies also
could not discriminate in their employment practices on the basis of sexual orientation).
139. Exec. Order No. B-54-79 (1979) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal). Ten states havo
proscribed sexual orientation discrimination in the public sector based on an Executive Order
California, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Washington and Colorado. Peter M. Cicchino, et al., Comment, Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights B1I
26 HARv. C.R.-C.L L REV. 549,557 n.40 (1991); see also Robert L Eblin, Domestic Partnership
Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and others), 51 OHIo
ST. LJ. 1067, 1068 n.5 (1990) (listing the same states except Colorado).
140. Executive Order B-54-79 (1979).
141. 63 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 583, 583-84 (1980).
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on which the state civil service could not discriminate.142 Section
18500(c)(5) states that applicants and employees are to be treated
equally without regard to sexual orientation.143 As a result, homo-
sexuals are statutorily protected from employment discrimination in
the civil service.
Notwithstanding the above protections, public employment was
only half the problem. Neither Gay Law Students, Labor Code
sections 1101 and 1102, Governor Brown's executive order, nor
Government Code section 18500 applied to homosexual employment
discrimination in the private sector. The California Supreme Court,
the California Governor, and the California Legislature each acted to
protect gays from job discrimination in the public sector.'44
However, such efforts were not forthcoming in regard to job discri-
mination by private employers. Compared to those protections
against public sector employment discrimination, the safeguards in
the private sector were non-existent.
B. Private Sector Employment
Within California, the only acknowledgement of any protection
against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
private sector prior to 1991 was contained in an Attorney General
Opinion written by John Van De Kamp.145 In 1986, former
Attorney General Van De Kamp was called upon to decide whether
Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 would prohibit a private
employer from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.146
Until that point, use of the Labor Code to protect homosexuals only
applied to public or quasi-public employers such as Pacific Tele-
phone & Telegraph."47 Gay Law Students was not concerned with
142. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1193, see. 1, at 2896.
143. CAL. GOVT CODE § 18500(cX5) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
144. See supra notes 118-144 and accompanying text (discussing each's attempt to protect
homosexuals from job discrimination in the public sector).
145. 69 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 80 (1986).
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning and application
of the Labor Code to public employers in Gay Law Students).
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whether such protection could also be used against a private
employer. 148
1. Attorney General Opinion by John Van De Kamp:
The First Recognition of the Prohibition Against
Sexual Orientation Job Discrimination in the Private
Sector
Former Attorney General Van De Kamp concluded that Labor
Code sections 1101 and 1102 prohibited a private employer from dis-
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation. 149 However, the
former attorney general did not directly respond to the question
presented in reaching the foregoing conclusion. Van De Kamp was
supposed to decide whether Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102
prohibited a private employer from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation, not whether non-manifest 50 homosexuals were
also protected by sections 1101 and 1102. He primarily focused his
opinion on whether non-manifest homosexuals were protected by the
Labor Code since the court in Gay Law Students limited its holding,
and thus the protections afforded by sections 1101 and 1102, to
manifest homosexuals. "' Van De Kamp apparently assumed that
a private employer is prevented from discriminating against homo-
sexuals under Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 so he could then
analyze whether non-manifest homosexuals were protected.
In former Attorney General Van De Kamp's analysis regarding
the application of sections 1101 and 1102 to private employers, he
concluded that Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 pertain to private
employers in light of the California Supreme Court's interpretation
of these sections in Fort v. Civil Service Commission."5 2 The court
in Fort had stated that sections 1101 and 1102 serve to protect "the
148. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
149. 69 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 80 (1986).
150. A non-manifested homosexual is one who does not identify himself as homosexual, who
does not defend homosexuality, or who is not identified with activist homosexual organizations. Id
at 82.
151. Id at 82.
152. Id; Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385,38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
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fundamental right of employees in general to engage in political
activity without interference by employers."153 Van De Kamp failed
to explicitly describe the implications of this statement, instead
assuming the applicability of sections 1101 and 1102 to private
employers. It might be reasoned from the statement that since
"employees in general" are protected while no limitation is applied
to "employers," Fort suggests that no distinction between public and
private exists. Thus, logically, if both public and private employees
are protected, then neither public nor private employers can discri-
minate based on an employee's political activities. However, if this
logic was the basis for Van De Kamp's conclusion, he failed to
include it in his analysis.
The former attorney general then stated that the most difficult
interpretive issue regarding the statutes was the determination of
which types of political action and affiliations would be protected
from arbitrary action by aprivate employer. 154 Van De Kamp
assumed, without further exploration, that private employers were
prohibited from arbitrary action in regard to the political activities of
their employees. "' Rather, the bulk of the opinion focused on the
protections for non-manifest homosexuals. Van De Kamp began his
analysis with the realization that the California Supreme Court had
already ruled that Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 protect
manifest homosexual employees, those that identify themselves as
homosexual, from reprisal by their employers.156 From this, he
concluded that non-manifest homosexuality must also be protected
since it is improbable that within the Labor Code the Legislature
intended to prohibit discrimination against persons who openly
express political views while condoning discrimination against
persons with undeclared political beliefs. 57 According to Van De
Kamp, the Legislature intended that political activities or affiliations,
153. Fort, 61 Cal. 2d at 335, 392 P.2d at 387, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (emphasis added).
154. 69 Cal. Op. Atty Gen. 80, 81 (1986).
155. See ihL
156. Id. at 82.
157. Id.
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whether private or public, should not be the basis for employment
decisions. 158
The former attorney general argued that sections 1101 and 1102
prohibit employer policies tending to regulate the political activities
or affiliations of employees, and prohibit the employer from
attempting to compel employees to adopt, follow, or refrain from
certain courses of political activity.5 9 He posited that if employers
were to discharge employees thought to be secretly gay, this would
influence employees to manifest their homosexuality in order to
embrace the protections of the Labor Code as enunciated in Gay Law
Students."° The former attorney general then concluded, since self-
identification as a homosexual is a political act, coercing or
influencing employees to declare their homosexuality on threat of
termination is coercing or influencing a political activity in violation
of Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102.16' Therefore, according to
Van De Kamp, by extension, non-manifest homosexuals were
protected under Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 in the same way
as were manifest homosexuals. 62
In sum, former Attorney General Van De Kamp contended that
all homosexuals, manifest and non-manifest, were protected from
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation whether in
the public or the private sector. 163 Such protection would allow
homosexuals employed in the private sector to bring a suit for
discrimination despite the absence of open advocation or mani-
festation of homosexuality. Standing alone, though, Van De Kamp's
opinion was inadequate to protect gays." However, the opinion
was adopted by an appellate court, whose decision subsequently
became AB 2601.




162. Id at 84.
163. Id. at 85.
164. See infra notes 210-211 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of precedential
authority of an attorney general opinion).
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2. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corporation: The First
Judicial Decision to Proscribe Sexual Orientation Job
Discrimination in the Private Sector
In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corporation, 16 three security
officer applicants of a Target Department Store filed a class action
challenging the requirement of Dayton Hudson Corporation (Target)
that any security officer applicant pass a psychological screening test
as a condition to being hired. 'The test was ostensibly designed
to screen out emotionally unstable applicants by asking questions on
various topics including religious attitudes and sexual orien-
tation. 67 Plaintiffs contended that such questions invaded their
right to privacy and violated Labor Code sections 1101 and
1102.168
The Court of Appeal for the First District decided the case on the
right to privacy claim. 169 The court stated that the California
Constitution explicitly protects the right to privacy. 170 The court
added that an invasion of one's privacy is prohibited unless there is
a compelling interest for the invasion. 171 Target conceded the fact
that its test was an invasion of an applicant's privacy, but argued that
it had a compelling interest in wanting to employ emotionally stable
persons as determined by this test. 172 The Soroka court did not
agree that this was a compelling interest, and held that Target's
165. 7 Cal. App. 4th 203, 1 CaL Rptr. 2d 77 (1991) review granted and opinion superseded
by 822 P.2d 1327, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (Jan. 31, 1992).
166. Id. at 207, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79.
167. Id. at207-08, 1CaL Rptr. 2dat79.
168. Id. at 209, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80. Plaintiff also claimed a cause of action under disclosure
of confidential medical information, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and unfair
business practices. Id.
169. Id. at 217, 1CaL Rptr. 2d at 86.
170. Id. at 211, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82. The California Constitution states: "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONSt. art. I, § 1.
171. Soroka, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 215, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-85.
172. Id. at 217, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. Target stated that it had noticed an overall improvement
in the quality and performance of store security officers since it implemented the test, but the court
held this not to be a compelling interest. Id.
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inquiry into the religious beliefs and sexual orientation of store
security officer applicants unjustifiably violated the state consti-
tutional right to privacy. 1
73
In dictum, the court also addressed plaintiff's claim regarding
violation of Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102.174 The Soroka
court stated the protections for political activity set forth in sections
1101 and 1102 and then remarked that applicants as well as
employees were protected under these sections. 175 The court went
on to cite and endorse the opinion of former Attorney General John
Van De Kamp, that sections 1101 and 1102 forbid a private employer
from discriminating against an employee on the basis of sexual
orientation. 1
76
One factor Target used in deciding whether to employ an
applicant was the degree to which an individual subscribed to
traditional values and mores and presumed an obligation to act in
accordance with those values. 177 According to the Soroka court,
certain questions on the psychological exam directly asked an
applicant to disclose his or her sexual orientation. 178 The court
concluded that applicants who expressed their homosexuality might
be stigmatized as willing to defy or violate the traditional values and
mores the company favored and thus those applicants would have an
invalid test precluding employment.179 As a result, the court in
Soroka determined that the psychological screening test discri-
minated against applicants who identified themselves as homosexual
in violation of section 1101, or alternatively, the test coerced such
persons into not disclosing their homosexuality for fear of not being
hired in violation of section 1102.180 In either case, the court
declared that the psychological screening test violated the Labor
Code.181
173. Id
174. Id at 219-20, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88.
175. IdM at 219-20, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88.
176. Id; see supra notes 149-164 and accompanying text (discussing Van Do Kamp's opinion).
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The Soroka court held that Target's pre-employment requirement
of psychological screening violated both the constitutional right to
privacy and statutory prohibitions against improper pre-employment
inquiries."8 2 The court also held that the test constituted discri-
minatory conduct by inquiring into applicants' religious beliefs and
sexual orientation.183 Soroka was quite important in that it was the
first judicial decision to recognize that a private employer could not
discriminate against an employee or applicant based on his or her
sexual orientation. AB 2601 codifies Soroka and this proposition.
However, prior to AB 2601, there was other protection in the form of
local ordinances.
C. Local Ordinances Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Mindful of the weaknesses in state-wide protection prior to
Soroka, cities and counties had enacted ordinances to protect homo-
sexuals within their jurisdictions." 4 According to a memorandum
prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
Southern California, there were only sixteen local governments in
California that had some type of sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance. 15 Three of the sixteen prohibited only public sector
182. Id. at 221, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89.
183. Id
184. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 13.26, §§ 13.28.010-13.28.100 (1978);
CATHEDRAL Crry, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 11.66, §§ 11.88.010-11.88.130 (1987); Cupertino,
Cal., Affirmative Action Policy Statement (1975); DAVIS, CAL, MuNIcIPAL CODE ch. 7A, §§ 7A-
1-7A-18 (1986); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL, MUNICIAL CODE ch. 1.07, §§ 1.07.010-1.07.110 (1984);
LONG BEACH, CAL, MuNicIAL CODE ch. 5.09, §§ 5.09.010-5.09.050 (1987); Los ANoEEs, CAL,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 12, §§ 49.70-49.80 (1979); Mountain View, Cal., Amended
Affirmative Action Program for the City of Mountain View (adopted by Res. Nos. 2060 and 2069);
OAKLAND, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE art. 20, §§ 3-20.01-3.20.08 (1984); SACRAMENTO, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§ 14.100-14.112 (1986); SAN DIEGO, CAL, MUNICPAL CODE div. 96,
§§ 52.9601-52.9615 (1990); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POUCE CODE art. 33, §§ 3301-3311 (1981);
San Jose, Cal., Policy No. 0-16 (1981); SANTA BARBARA, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 9.126,9.130,
§§ 9.126.010-9.126.030, 9.130.010-9.130.030 (1972); SANTA MONICA, CAL, MUNICIPAL CODE
ch. 9, §§ 4900-4910 (1984); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. IV, §§ 4200-4210
(1984).
185. Memorandum prepared by ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Local Sexual
Orientation Non-Discrimination Ordinances (Mar. 28, 1991) [hereinafter Ordinances] (copy on file
at the Pacific Law Journal). These sixteen cities are: Berkeley, Cathedral City, Cupertino, Davis,
Laguna Beach, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Mountain View, Oakland, Sacramento, San Diego, San
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employment discrimination against homosexuals. 186 Hence, merely
thirteen cities in California prohibited sexual orientation employment
discrimination in the private sector.87
According to the memorandum, of those thirteen cities, just
eleven had reasonably comprehensive regulations prohibiting various
types of sexual orientation employment discrimination. ' The
Sacramento ordinance and the San Francisco ordinance were limited
by the fact that each applied to employers of six or more persons. 9
The ordinances of Cathedral City, Davis, Laguna Beach, Long Beach
and San Diego applied to employers with five or more
employees. 9 ' The ordinances of West Hollywood, Berkeley,
Oakland, and Los Angeles tended to be the most comprehensive in
that West Hollywood required at least one employee and the other
three cities did not set a minimum on the number of employees that
had to be employed to invoke the ordinance.' 9'
Nevertheless, the comprehensiveness of these ordinances was
questionable. As for the eleven cities having fairly comprehensive
regulations, six of them provided some sort of exemption for reli-
gious organizations, thereby forcing homosexuals to rely on other
protections.'9 2 Only Berkeley, Oakland, Sacramento, San
Francisco, and West Hollywood did not have express exemptions for
religious organizations. 193 Two others, Laguna Beach and
Cathedral City, also exempted non-profit organizations. 194 In
addition, every ordinance created an affirmative defense for
employment decisions based on a bona fide occupational quali-
fication, thereby shielding employers from liability when they failed
Francisco, San lose, Santa Barbara, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood. Id; see supra note 182
(specifically citing the various ordinances).
186. Ordinances, supra note 185, at 2. These three cities are: Cupertino, Mountain View, and
San Jose. Id
187. Id
188. Id at 3.
189. Id at 4.
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. Id at 5.
192. Id
193. Id
194. Id at 6.
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to hire or terminated a homosexual for a bona fide occupational
reason. 195 Although AB 2601 does not preempt these ordi-
nances,'" the need for them has been diminished with the passage
of AB 2601.
IV. ADEQUACY OF PROTECTIONS AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRM[NATION
Opponents of gay civil rights have argued that homosexuals were
afforded adequate protection under the law and therefore no need for
AB 2601 existed."9 However, upon closer analysis of the case law,
the local ordinances, and the constitutional provisions, it becomes
clear that AB 2601 was quite necessary and vitally important in the
progress toward equal rights for homosexuals. Protections against
employment discrimination prior to AB 2601 were insufficient since:
(1) Gay Law Students was limited given the quasi-governmental
character of the defendant and the manifest homosexuality of the
plaintiffs;198 (2) the opinion of former Attorney General Van De
Kamp had no binding authority;199 (3) Soroka was limited since it
discussed Labor Code protections for homosexuals in dictum, and
since it has been suspended pending review;2 and (4) the local
ordinances applied to only approximately twenty-five percent of
California's population20 ' and those ordinances may have been pre-
empted by the FEHA anyway.' °
195. Id. An example of a bona fide occupational qualification which a female would fail to
meet, thereby permitting discrimination, would be a prison guard in a male maximum security prison.
8 B.E. WrTcN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law, § 760 (9th ed. 1988).
196. AB 2601 Fact Shee4 supra note 5, at 5.
197. See AB 2601 Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 1; Veto Message of Governor Pete Wilson
Concerning AB 101 (1991) (discussing the adequacy of protection prior to the passage of AB 2601).
198. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of Gay Law
Students).
199. See infra notes 208-213 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of attorney
general opinions).
200. See infra notes 214-224 and accompanying text (discussing Soroka).
201. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability of
local ordinances).
202. See infra notes 227-240 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of preemption).
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A. California Equal Protection Clause: Its Limitations
In Gay Law Students, one area of the law used to prohibit Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph from discriminating against homosexuals
was the equal protection clause of the California Constitution." 3
However, the equal protection clause only applies to state or govern-
mental entities.20 4 Consequently, the applicability of the equal
protection clause to combat job discrimination was limited to sexual
orientation discrimination by public or perhaps quasi-public
employers only. Gay Law Students did nothing to address the discri-
mination perpetrated by private employers.
B. Van De Kamp's Attorney General Opinion: Not Binding
Authority
Former Attorney General Van De Kamp argued that Labor Code
sections 1101 and 1102 protect manifest and non-manifest gays from
job discrimination by private employers. 2 5 However, Gay Law
Students, the decision upon which Van De Kamp relied for his
opinion, restricted the application of Labor Code sections 1101 and
1102 to manifest homosexuals.2 6 In Gay Law Students, self-
identification as a homosexual was defined as a political act, and thus
protected by sections 1101 and 1102.207 A problem existed,
however, as to persons who did not publicly identify themselves as
homosexual since persons who did not advocate or manifest homo-
sexuality were not technically engaged in a "political activity," and
thus could not invoke the protections of sections 1101 and 1102.
203. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 467, 595
P.2d 592, 597, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19 (1979); see supra notes 118-137 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasoning of Gay Law Students).
204. See supra notes 118-137 and accompanying text (discussing Gay Law Students).
205. See supra notes 149-164 and accompanying text (discussing Van De Kamp's opinion).
206. Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 488, 595 P.2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33; see
supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text (discussing the court's use of the Labor Code).
207. See supra notes 118-137 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of Gay Law
Students).
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Former Attorney General John Van De Kamp attempted to
remedy this problem in attorney general opinion number 85-404.208
The opinion concluded that non-manifest homosexuals should be
afforded the same protections as manifest homosexuals under Labor
Code sections 1101 and 1102.2' Nevertheless, an attorney general
.21O~~~An attorney eea pnoopinion is not controlling authority. y general opinion
serves only as an advisory opinion with no precedential value.2 n
Therefore, if the former attorney general's opinion had been the only
authority for applying the Labor Code to non-manifest homosexuals,
courts would not have been compelled to apply such protection to
persons who had not manifested their homosexuality.
Van De Kamp also attempted to include private employers within
the reach of sections 1101 and 1102.212 The opinion concluded that
Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 proscribed sexual orientation
discrimination by a private employer, but the opinion did not reveal
Van De Kamp's reasoning in support of this conclusion. 213 As a
result, the reasoning of the opinion offers no framework upon which
future plaintiffs could build an argument that private employers were
prohibited by Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 from discri-
minating against homosexuals. However, the decision in Soroka v.
Dayton Hudson Corporation214 supplemented this deficiency by
208. See 69 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 80 (1986); supra notes 149-164 and accompanying text
(discussing Van De Kamp's opinion).
209. 69 Cal. Op. Atty Gen. at 82; see supra note 149 and accompanying text (stating Van De
Kamp's conclusion).
210. People v. Vallerga, 67 Cal. App. 3d 847,870, 136 Cal. Rptr. 429,441 (1977); Wenke v.
Hitchcock, 6 Cal. 3d 746, 751-52, 493 P.2d 1154, 1158, 100 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (1972); see Lawe
v. Chateaux & Manor Houses, Inc., No. 17-27133/188, Dept. of Industrial Relations, Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement (1987) (refusing to follow Van De Kamp's opinion but instead holding
that manifest or perceived homosexuality without other political activity is not protected under Labor
Code §§ 1101 and 1102).
211. Vaierga, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 870,136 Cal. Rptr. at 441; Wenke, 6 Cal. 3d at 751-52,493
P.2d at 1158, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
212. 69 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. at 81; see supra notes 149-164 and accompanying text (describing
Van De Kamp's analysis).
213. 69 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. at 80; see supra notes 147-162 and accompanying text (discussing
Van De Kamp's opinion).
214. 7 Cal. App. 4th 203, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1991).
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stating that a private employer could not discriminate against a
homosexuals. 215
C. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corporation: Dictum
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corporation provided support for the
conclusion that homosexuals were protected against discrimination
by private employers as well as validated former Attorney General
Van De Kamp's opinion by incorporating the opinion into the court's
analysis. 216 The Soroka court stated that Labor Code sections 1101
and 1102 prohibited a private employer from discriminating against
an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.1 7 However, the
usefulness of Soroka was doubtful because it had been suspended
pending review by the California Supreme Court.21
The appellate court in Soroka prefaced its treatment of Labor
Code sections 1101 and 1102 with the following: "[Ilt is not
necessary for us to address the statutory issues [i.e., sections 1101
and 1102] to resolve the question of whether the preliminary
injunction should issue."219 The court nonetheless discussed Labor
Code sections 1101 and 1102 to aid the trial court on remand.220
Since the discussion of Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 was
unnecessary to the resolution of the case, it was considered to be
dictum.221 As dictum, it had no force as precedent.222 Soroka at
least affirmed the constitutional right to privacy for employees and
215. See supra notes 163-181 and accompanying text (discussing Soroka).
216. Soroka, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 209-10, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88.
217. Id at 209-10, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88; see supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text
(stating the holding in Soroka).
218. See 822 P.2d 1327, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (1992); CAL. R. Cr. 976(d) (prohibiting the
publication of opinions superseded by a grant of review); CAL. R. Cr. 977(a) (prohibiting courts or
parties to an action from citing or relying upon unpublished opinions); Faitz v. Ruegg, 114 Cal. App.
3d 967, 970, 171 Cal. Rptr. 149, 150 (1981) (declaring that unpublished cases may not be cited or
used for precedential value).
219. Soroka, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 218, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86 (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. 9 B.E. WrrmnI, CALI.ORNIA CIVIi. PRocmuA, Appea § 783 (3d ed. 1985); see also
BtLAc.'s LAw DICiONARY 409 (5th ed. 1979) (defining dictum as statements and comments in an
opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to
determination of the case in hand).
222. 9 B.E. WrnoN, CALIFoRNiA CrviL PROCEDURE, Appeal, § 783 (3d ed. 1985).
576
1993 / Gay Civil Rights
applicants.223 This right to privacy could not be violated absent a
compelling reason where the information sought was job-related.224
Thus, in the hope of avoiding discrimination, a homosexual employee
or applicant could have chosen not to disclose his or her homo-
sexuality. An employer would most likely have been unable to
inquire about such information and so the employee or applicant had
a smidgen of protection. Of course, this tactic offered little protection
for those who had manifested their homosexuality, for once an
employer discovered an employee's homosexuality, the constitutional
right to privacy could not prevent that employer from discharging or
otherwise discriminating against that employee because of that
employee's sexual orientation. However, if the employee was within
the twenty-five percent of California's population protected by a
local ordinance, perhaps he or she still had some legal recourse.
D. Local Ordinances: Preemption
The protections provided by local ordinances were limited given
the number of such ordinances and the existence of the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act (FEHA). There were merely sixteen local
ordinances in California dealing with employment discrimination
against homosexuals, and three of those applied only to public
employers.225 These sixteen ordinances protected approximately
seven million persons in California-only twenty-five percent of
California's population. 6 Therefore, three-quarters of California's
population could not rely on a local ordinance to protect themselves
from employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
223. Soroka, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 221, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88; see supra notes 165-183 and
accompanying text (discussing Soroka). However, such affirmation is in jeopardy since the California
Supreme Court granted review and suspended Soroka to review the constitutional right to privacy.
Soroka, 822 P.2d 1327, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (Jan. 31, 1992).
224. Soroka, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 217, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86; see supra notes 165-183 and
accompanying text (discussing Soroka).
225. See supra notes 182-194 and accompanying text (discussing the application of local
ordinances).
226. Chart prepared by Lobby for Individual Freedom and Equality (undated) (copy on file at
the Pacific Law Journal); The Heart of AB 101, supra note 29.
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Although local ordinances appeared to provide limited protection
for homosexuals, this protection was illusory since the FEHA
probably preempted the local ordinances. 7 California Government
Code section 12993(c) states that it is the Legislature's intention to
occupy the field of regulation of employment and housing discri-
mination with the FEHA." The FEHA was to act exclusive of all
other laws prohibiting employment and housing discrimination
enacted by any city, county, or other political subdivision of the
state.2  This language appeared to preempt all local ordinances
with the FEIA.
However, no California appellate court had yet to address
squarely the issue whether the FEHA preempted local ordinances
prohibiting sexual brientation discrimination in housing and employ-
ment. In October of 1991, a Los Angeles County Superior Court
Judge, in a minute order, held invalid the anti-discrimination
ordinance of Los Angeles on the ground that the FEHA preempted
local ordinances. 230 However, in April of 1990, a superior court
judge in San Francisco had held in two separate cases that San
Francisco's ordinance prohibiting employment discrimination against
homosexuals was not preempted by the FEHA.231 The Los Angeles
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal for the Second
District.z 2 However, a recent case by the California Supreme Court
may have already resolved the issue.
Rojo v. Kliger, 233 a case dealing with whether the FEHA
provided the exclusive remedy for injuries relating to sex discri-
mination in employment, discussed the preemption issue. In Rojo, the
227.. See Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 81, 801 P.2d 373,383,276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 140 (1990)
(discussing the Legislature's intent to preempt local anti-discrimination law).
228. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12993(c) (West 1992).
229. Id.
230. Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, LA. Super. CL No. C759189 (Oct. 9, 1991), appeal
filed, No. B063458 (Cal. CL App. 2d Dist. 1992); Scott Harris, City's Gay Rights Ordinance Faces
Test in Court Case, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1991, at Bl.
231. Ertag v. Western Union Corp., S.F. Super. CL No. 907720 (Apr. 3, 1990); McComb v.
AT&T, S.F. Super. Ctu No. 849144 (Apr. 3, 1990); Martha Groves, Frequent Job Bias Leaves Little
Recourse, Gays Say, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at Al.
232. Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, L.A. Super. CL No. C759189 (Oct. 9, 1991), appeal
filed, No. B063458 (Cal. CL App. 2d Dist. 1992).
233. 52 Cal. 3d 65, 801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990).
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California Supreme Court held that the FEHA does not supplant other
state laws or common law relating to discrimination in employ-
ment.234 Nevertheless, in reviewing the history of the FEHA, the
court determined that the Legislature intended that the Rumford Fair
Housing Act23 and the Fair Employment Practices Act,236 both
of which were later combined to become the Fair Employment and
Housing Act,237 excluded all other local laws banning housing
discrimination and employment discrimination. 8 Thus, according
to the Rojo court, the intent of the Legislature in enacting the FEHA
was to preempt local anti-discrimination law, but not to preempt state
law such as the Unruh Civil Rights Act." Therefore, a strong argu-
ment existed for the proposition that the FEHA, which includes
Government Code section 12993(c), preempted local ordinances
proscribing sexual orientation discrimination. If this was the case,
homosexuals had no direct statutory protection from employment
discrimination since the FEHA did not protect sexual orientation.24
In the public sector, some protection was available under Cali-
fornia's equal protection clause and under Labor Code sections 1101
and 1102.24' However, these protections were limited to persons
who manifested or expressed their homosexuality.242 In the private
sector, there was almost no protection. Soroka applied Labor Code
sections 1101 and 1102 to private employers, but did so in dictum. In
addition, Soroka was suspended pending review. 243 Local ordi-
nances were of little help since they were limited in geo-graphic
scope and probably preempted by the FEHA.2 4 These inadequacies
234. Id at 70, 801 P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
235. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 992, see. 8, at 3166 (repealing CAL. HEALTH & SAFEMY CODE §
35700-35745).
236. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 992, sec. 11, at 3166 (repealing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1433).
237. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992).
238. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 78, 801 P.2d at 380, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
239. Id. at 81, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
240. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing the FEHA). Of course Labor
Code §§ 1101 and 1102 provide some protection, but they were not directly intended to protect
homosexuals as were the local ordinances.
241. See supra notes 118-136 and accompanying text (discussing California's equal protection
clause and Labor Code §§ 1101 and 1102).
242. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 225-240 and accompanying text.
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in the protections accorded gays from job discrimination paved the
way for AB 2601.
V. ASSEMBLY BILL 2601
A. The First Statute Protecting Gays from Private Sector Job
Discrimination
Prior to September of 1992, the only protection for gays from job
discrimination by private employers consisted of an attorney general
opinion, one appellate case, and local ordinances. However, these
three bases of protection proved inadequate.24 As a result, AB
2601 was enacted to strengthen the protections afforded homosexuals
against job discrimination by private employers.4 6 The bill, intro-
duced by Assemblymember Terry Friedman on February 11, 1992,
and signed by Governor Pete Wilson on September 25, 1992,
performs two functions: (1) It codifies Gay Law Students v. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph and Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp.; and
(2) it creates Labor Code section 1102.1.27 This new Labor Code
section prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in any
245. See supra notes 225-240 and accompanying text.
246. See generally Review of Selected 1992 California Legislation, 24 PAc. L. 969 (1993)
(discussing AB 2601 and its history).
247. The new section reads in its entirety:
(a) Sections 1101 and 1102 prohibit discrimination or different treatment in any aspect of
employment or opportunity for employment based on actual or pereeved sexual
orientation.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Employer" as used in this chapter includes any person regularly employing five
or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,
including the state or any political subdivision of the state.
(2) "Employer" as used in this chapter does not include a religious association or
corporation not organized for private profit, whether incorporated as a religious or public
benefit corporation.
(c) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any marital status classification that is
otherwise valid.
(d) Nothing in this section shall require or permit the use of quotas or other such
affirmative action.
(e) Nothing in this section shall interfere with whatever existing rights an employer has
to base employment actions on the commission of conduct illegal in California.
(f) Section 1103 on criminal penalties shall not apply to a violation of this section.
1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 915, sec. 2, at 3771 (West) (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1).
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aspect of employment. 248 AB 2601 codifies the protection ori-
ginated in Gay Law Students, developed by former Attorney General
John Van De Kamp, and recognized in Soroka v. Dayton Hudson
Corp.
AB 2601 took effect on January 1, 1993.249 The true rami-
fications of the bill may be minimal at first since AB 2601 simply
codifies the procedures underway in the Department of Industrial
Relations.250 Since October 31, 1991, soon after the holding in
Soroka, the Department of Industrial Relations began accepting
complaints by homosexuals for job discrimination as per Governor
Wilson's instructions. 25t The State Labor Commissioner, head of
the subdivision of the Department of Industrial Relations known as
the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, 1 2 is the party who
actually investigates the complaints. 3 If the Labor Commissioner
determines that a violation has occurred, he or she must order the
employer to cease and desist from the violation. 1 4 In addition, the
Commissioner has the authority to reinstate an employee wrongfully
terminated as well as the authority to order payment of back
wages.'5 However, the Commissioner may not levy fines or award
compensatory damages to victims of discrimination." 6
AB 2601 is the culmination of some fifteen years effort to enact
a statute to protect homosexuals from employment discrimi-
nation.25 The bill is a positive step in the right direction, but it does
not do enough. Homosexuals are still treated differently from other
groups discriminated against such as women, minorities, the
248. 1992 Cal. Legis. Sew. ch. 915, sec. 2, at 3771 (West).
249. Greg Lucas & David Tuler, Surprise After Earlier Veto of Stronger Legislation, SY.
CHRON, Sept 26, 1992, at Al.
250. George Skelton, Wilson Signs Bill On Gay Job Rights, L.A. TIMs, Sept. 26,1992, at Al;
Amy Chance, Governor Signs Gay Rights Bill, SAcAmnTo BEE, Sept. 26, 1992, at Al.
251. Lucas & Tuler, supra note 249, at Al.
252. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 79, 82 (West 1989).
253. See id § 98.7(a) (West 1989); Chance, supra note 250, at Al.
254. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7(c) (West 1989).
255. Md
256. Chance, supra note 250, at Al.
257. Xd
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handicapped, and divorced persons, all of whom are included within
the Fair Employment and Housing Act while gays are not.2 8
B. Inadequacies ofAB 2601
In light of the inadequate protection prior to AB 2601, the
Legislature enacted AB 2601 making great strides towards fully pro-
tecting homosexuals from job discrimination. AB 2601 creates Labor
Code section 1102.1, which prohibits discrimination or different
treatment in any aspect of employment or opportunity for employ-
ment based on actual or perceived sexual orientation.259 However,
the bill is inadequate when compared to the other possible means of
protecting homosexuals from employment discrimination. Speci-
fically, the procedures and principles of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) make protection under the Labor Code insuffi-
cient.
Governor Pete Wilson signed AB 2601 because it was less
onerous and less costly to employers than any prohibition under the
FEHA. 2 ° In essence, he is correct. The Labor Code differs pro-
cedurally from the FEHA in limiting the opportunity for claimants to
seek full compensation for job discrimination.
Under AB 2601, the Department of Industrial Relations, though
the State Labor Commissioner, handles complaints of sexual orien-
tation employment discrimination. 26' However, the main concern
of the Labor Commissioner is the enforcement of laws regarding
wages, hours, and benefits and the investigation of certainjob-related
safety and environmental violations-not to investigate job discri-
mination.262 Under the FEHA, the Department of Fair Employment
and Housing investigates job discrimination complaints by those
258. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the FEHA).
259. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 915, sec. 2, at 3771 (West).
260. Letter from Governor Pete Wilson to the members of the California Assembly regarding
AB 2601 (Sept. 25, 1992) (on file at the Pacific Law Journalb; Skelton, supra note 250, at Al.
261. See 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 915, sec. 1, at 3771 (West); CAL LAB. CODE § 98.7 (West
1989).
262. See CAL. LAB. Coon §§ 96,98 (West 1989); David Link, Mixed Victoryfor Gays, L.A.
DAIMY J., Oct. 9, 1992, at 4.
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protected thereunder, which does not include homosexuals.263 A
wasteful duplicity of function exists between these two state
departments. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing
should be the governmental department responsible for investigating
all job discrimination complaints.2 "
Besides defining the entity actually investigating the complaint,
the Labor Code and the FEHA differ procedurally in its respective
approach to the timing of the complaints and the timing of the sub-
sequent investigations. Under the Labor Code, a complainant only
has thirty days from the occurrence of the alleged discrimination in
which to file a complaint with the Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement.2  Under the FEHA, a complainant has up to one year
in which to file a complaint.266 This difference puts homosexuals
at a disadvantage in that they must decide to file a complaint for
discrimination within a much shorter time frame than a person
protected by the FEHA.
In addition, once a complaint is filed with the respective depart-
ment or division, the Labor Commissioner, investigating the com-
plaint brought by a homosexual, only has sixty days in which to
complete the investigation.267 The Department of Fair Employment
and Housing, investigating the complaint brought by a racial minority
or woman, has up to one year in which to complete its inquiry.26
Consequently, those persons protected by the FEHA potentially
receive ten extra months of investigation just by the fact that they are
included in the FEHA, while homosexuals are limited to one-sixth
the investigatory time merely because they are protected by the Labor
Code and not the FEHA.
Finally, the most important procedural difference lies in the con-
clusiveness of the Labor Code. Once an employee files an admini-
strative complaint with the Labor Commissioner, that employee may
263. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12930(f) (West 1992); Skelton, supra note 250, at Al.
264. Link, supra note 262, at 4.
265. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7(a) (West 1989); Lucas & Tuller, supra note 249, at Al; Letter
from Governor Pete Wilson to the members of the California Assembly regarding AB 2601 (Sept
25, 1992) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
266. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 12960 (West 1992); Lucas & Tuller, supra note 249, at Al.
267. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7(e) (West 1989); Lucas & Tuller, supra note 249, at Al.
268. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12965(a) (West 1992).
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not then sue his or her employer in a court of law, unless the
Commissioner dismisses the complaint.269 In contrast, a claimant
under the FEHA has the right to sue his or her employer directly if
unsatisfied with the administrative remedy. 270 Thus, a racial
minority, woman, divorced person, or handicapped person, all
protected by the FEHA, gets two bites at the remedial apple-the
administrative hearing and a court of law-while a homosexual is left
with the apple core of the administrative hearing. This in and of itself
seems unjust.
Procedural inequity is not the only deficiency underlying AB
2601. The principles behind the FEHA recognize that certain
minority populations within society are subject to discrimination by
the majority, and are thus deserving of protection.271 Surely
homosexuals qualify as one of these minority populations who have
been subject to discrimination.272 The California Supreme Court
has stated "[t]he aims of the struggle for homosexual rights, and the
tactics employed, bear a close analogy to the continuing struggle for
civil rights waged by blacks, women, and other minorities."2" But
instead of acknowledging homosexuals as coequal with blacks,
women, and other minorities through the FEHA, AB 2601 relegates
the gay community to the Labor Code, a section of the law not totally
designed to combat employment discrimination.27' The District of
Columbia and five other states-Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Wisconsin-proscribe sexual orientation discri-
mination in employment within their respective anti-discrimination
269. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7(d) (West 1989); Link, supra note 262, at 4; Skelton, supra
note 250, at Al; Letter from Governor Pete Wilson to the members of the California Assembly
regarding AB 2601 (Sept 25,1992) (stating that the procedures provided by the Labor Commissioner
are an exclusive administrative remedy). But see DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 2, 1992, at 4 (stating that
Governor Wilson erred in his statement that AB 2601 offers an exclusive administrative remedy).
270. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1992); Link, supra note 262, at 4.
271. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12921 (West 1992) (recognizing and declaring to be a civil right
the opportunity to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination for those minority groups
within socitty subject to discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age).
272. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (listing satistics regarding employment
discrimination against homosexuals).
273. Gay Law Students Assn v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458,488,595
P.2d 592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979).
274. Link, supra note 262, at 4.
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statutes. 275 These states treat discrimination against homosexuals
equally with discrimination against women and racial minorities.2 7 6
Why does California not do the same? Some commentators have
asked, "[i]f gays are protected from job discrimination like everyone
else, why not give them access to the same process?" 277 The pro-
tection afforded homosexuals under AB 2601 is a great step forward
in the fight for equal rights for gays. But unequal remedies may
perpetuate unequal rights.27 By failing to amend the FEHA to
expressly include sexual orientation, the government tacitly concedes
that homosexuals are less deserving of protection than racial
minorities, women, divorced persons, handicapped persons, and the
other individuals protected by the FEHA.
VI. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAW
Mindful of the previously discussed deficiencies in protection for
homosexuals, even those existing in AB 2601, two alternative
proposals to AB 2601 would better protect gays: Amend the Cali-
fornia Constitution and/or amend the Fair Employment and Housing
Act.
Article I, section 8 of the California Constitution speaks directly
to employment discrimination. It states "[a] person may not be dis-
qualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation,
or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or
ethnic origin."279 Section 8 should be amended to expressly list
sexual orientation as a protected category, thereby recognizing the
right of homosexuals to the same protection from job discrimination
275. See 1991 Conn. Acts 91-58 (Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15113, § 4 (West Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §111.31-111.395 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
In addition, discrimination based on sexual orientation is prolbited in the Canadian provinces of
Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and the Yukon. Peter O'Neil, Some Tory MPs Feel Bible Tells Them to
Oppose Gay RAghtls VANcouv SUN, May 1, 1992, at A4.
276. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1991) (stating that it shall be unlawful to
discriminate in employment because of race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry,
disability, marital status, or arrest and court record).
277. Link, supra note 262, at 4.
278. Id.
279. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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as enjoyed by women and racial minorities. Article I, section 8 of the
California Constitution should be amended to read: "A person may
not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession,
vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, national
or ethnic origin, or sexual orientation." Additionally, such an amend-
ment would prohibit employment discrimination against gays in both
public and private employment, obviating the dichotomy between
public and private protection.28
In addition to amending the California Constitution, an amend-
ment to the Fair Employment and Housing Act is needed to expressly
protect gays from employment as well as housing discrimination.28'
Protection under the FEHA would also recognize that discrimination
against homosexuals is akin to discrimination against racial minor-
ities, women, and the other groups protected in the FEHA.28
2
Government Code section 12940, part of the FEHA, should be
amended to expressly mention sexual orientation. Section 12940 pro-
hibits employment discrimination based on those categories listed in
the statute.8 3 Sexual orientation should be placed alongside race,
religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap,
medical condition, marital status, and sex as grounds upon which one
may not discriminate in employment. Government Code section
12940 should be amended to read:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice... (a) For an employer,
because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or sexual
orientation of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to
refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment,
or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training
280. Gay Law Students Assn v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 495,595
P.2d 592, 615, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 37 (1979) (Richardson, J., dissenting). Granted, AB 2601 also
applies to both public and private employers. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 915, sec. 2, at 3771 (West).
281. AB 101 would have accomplished this goal. See A.B. 101, 1991-1992, Calif. Leg. Reg.
Sess. (Dec. 4, 1990) (listing sexual orientation as a protected class under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act).
282. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (describing the comparison between the
struggle for homosexual rights and the struggle for minority rights recognized by the Califomia
Supreme Court).
283. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the FEHA).
586
1993 / Gay Civil Rights
program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
Express statutory inclusion within the FEHA is the only way to
insure that homosexuals are granted the full right to protection
enjoyed by other minority groups in society.
Gays also need additional protection from discrimination in
housing. AB 2601 has no application to housing discrimination.
Therefore, Government Code section 12955, also part of the FEHA,
should be amended to explicitly list sexual orientation as an unlawful
grounds upon which to discriminate in housing. Government Code
section 12955 should be amended to say: "It shall be unlawful: (a)
For the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against
any person because of the race, color, religion, sex, marital status,
national origin, ancestry, familial status, disability or sexual
orientation of any person seeking to purchase, rent or lease any
housing accommodation." As a supplementary measure, the Unruh
Civil Rights Act should also be amended to expressly enumerate
sexual orientation so as to further solidify protection for homosexuals
against housing discrimination. Civil Code section 51 should be
amended to read:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
blindness or other physical disability, or sexual orientation are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
Only after such amendments will gays truly be protected from
housing discrimination.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sexual orientation discrimination is a problem that affects all
persons in California-whether homosexual, bisexual or heterosexual.
As Martin Luther King, Jr. said, "[w]e are caught in an inescapable
network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever
587
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affects one directly, affects all indirectly." '284 Discrimination
against homosexuals not only taints those involved, but denigrates
society as a whole. Fortunately, the courts, the Legislature, and
society have seen fit to act to ameliorate the plight of gays subject to
housing and employment discrimination.
Courts have construed the Unruh Civil Rights Act to protect
homosexuals from housing discrimination.285 Hubert v. Williams
held that homosexuals are protected from arbitrary discrimination in
rental housing by the Unruh Act.286 In Harris v. Capital Growth
Investors XIV, the California Supreme Court implicitly affirmed this
proposition by using homosexuality to demonstrate that categories
protected by the Unruh Act are all based on personal charac-
teristics.287 Of course, the holding in Harris never explicitly stated
that homosexuals are protected by the Unruh Act and Hubert is only
a decision by the appellate department of a superior court with little
or no precedential value.
In the past, homosexuals were protected from employment
discrimination, at least in the public sector, by Gay Law Students
Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph.288 The monu-
mental decision of Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corporation provided
additional protection for those working in the private sector, but the
opinion was suspended pending review by the California Supreme
Court.2"9 Local ordinances were enacted to augment the scant state-
wide protection which existed for homosexual employees. 2 °
However, these ordinances were geographically disparate, varying
from city to city, and they only protected one-quarter of California's
284. KING, supra note 1, at 77.
285. See supra notes 29-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
286. 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982).
287. 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1161, 805 P.2d 873, 883, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 624 (1991); see supra
notes 91-109 and accompanying text (discussing Harris and its application).
288. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488,
595 P.2d 592, 610-11,156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1979) (creating a strained interpretation of the Labor
Code to protect homosexuals in the public sector).
289. 7 Cal. App. 4th 203, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1991) review granted and opinion superseded
by 822 P.2d 1327,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (Jan. 31, 1992).
290. See supra notes 184-196 and accompanying text (describing the local ordinances).
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population. Besides, the FEHA, which does not protect homosexuals,
probably preempted these ordinances.29
1
Growing out of this confusion, lack of uniformity, and overall
lack of protection, the California Legislature enacted AB 2601 which
codified both Gay Law Students and Soroka, and expressly stated that
an employer may not discriminate on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.2' The enactment of AB 2601 is heralded as a great advance-
ment in the struggle for gay civil rights, but at least one commentator
has had less enthusiasm. 293 "AB 2601 is a step forward. But it's
nowhere near enough." 2"
Existing state law may be adequate to protect gays from housing
discrimination and employment discrimination. But adequacy is not
fruition in the struggle for gay civil rights. As Martin Luther King, Jr.
said, "[i]njustice must be rooted out by strong, persistent and deter-
mined action." 295 Those directly involved in the gay civil rights
movement must not stop with their moderate victory, but persevere
until homosexuals are accorded the same recognition and the same
protection as other minority groups in society.
Thomas Weathers
291. See supra notes 227-240 and accompanying text (discussing possible preemption).
292. 1992 Cal. Legis. Ser,. ch. 915, sec. 1-2, at 3771 (West).
293. See Link, supra note 262, at 4; see also Stephen G. Hirsch, Governor Signs Watered-
Down Gay Rights BilL REcoRDER, Sept. 28, 1992, at 4 (describing AB 2601 as a pro-employer bill
and a more moderate version of the vetoed AB 101).
294. Link, supra note 262, at 4.
295. KINO, supra note 1, at 89.
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